

## Message Text

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DIA WASHDC

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CINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: USA JOURNAL ON SCHLESINGER'S DISMISSAL

1. SUMMARY. IN THE DECEMBER EDITION OF THE U.S. A. JOURNAL, AN ARTICLE BY N.N. GLAGOLYEV ANALYZES THE CABINET CHANGES MADE BY THE PRESIDENT IN LATE OCTOBER. HE CONCLUDES THAT THEY WERE MADE PRIMARILY TO STRENGTHEN THE PRESIDENT'S HAND IN THE COMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN, AND, THOUGH HE TIES SCHLESINGER TO DIFFICULTIES IN SALT, HE CONTENDS THAT THE LATTER'S REPLACEMENT BY RUMSFELD WILL BRING ABOUT NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN PENTAGON POLICIES ON DETENTE. HE SEEMS TO CONCLUDE THAT WHILE THE CHANGES MAY NOT DO MUCH TO PROMOTE GREATER U.S. ADHERENCE TO A DETENTE POLICY FAVORABLE TO SOVIET INTERESTS, NEITHER DO THEY DO ANYTHING TO PRECLUDE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. GLAGOLYEV IN HIS ARTICLE RELIES EXTENSIVELY ON THE U.S. PRESS TO MAKE HIS POINTS FOR HIM. HE SAYS THAT "THE MAJORITY  
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OF OBSERVERS REGARD THE CHANGES AS AN INDICATION OF THE PRE-

SIDENT'S DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATION ON THE EVE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN," AND QUOTES EXCERPTS FROM THE NYT AND UPI TO BACK UP HIS FINDING. HE INVESTIGATES ON HIS OWN HOOK SCHLESINGER'S REPUTATION AS A "STUBBORN OPPONENT OF DETENTE," CONCLUDING THAT SCHLESINGER INDEED "LONG ATTEMPTED TO THROW A SHADOW ON ANY STEPS TOWARD LIMITATION OF WEAPONS, OFTEN MAKING HIS PLAY ON THE BASIS OF THE OLD BUGABOO OF 'A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY'." BUT GLAGOLYEV CALLS ON THE FRENCH NEWSPAPER AURORA TO MAKE A MORE SERIOUS ACCUSATION: SCHLESINGER NOT ONLY ATTEMPTED TO PREVENT A SALT II, "BUT ALSO TO DENOUNCE THE FIRST AGREEMENT REACHED IN THIS AREA."

3. GLAGOLYEV SAYS THAT THE "NOISE" RAISED BY SCHLESINGER AROUND CONGRESSIONAL CUTS IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DOWNFALL. HE IMPLIES THAT SCHLESINGER'S ATTEMPTS TO CONVINCE CONGRESS OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANOTHER "MISSILE GAP" FELL ON HARD TIMES WHEN SENATOR PROXMIRE REFUTED AS GROUNLESS HIS CONTENTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS SPENDING FIFTY PERCENT MORE ON DEFENSE THAN IS THE U.S.

4. A FURTHER REASON GIVEN BY THE U.S. PRESS FOR SCHLESINGER'S DISMISSAL, CONTINUES GLAGOLYEV, WAS HIS DIFFERENCES WITH THE SECRETARY. QUOTING FROM THE NYT, HE SAYS THAT AMONG THESE WERE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON A "WHOLE SERIES OF QUESTIONS WHICH SLOWED UP AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BASICALLY...ON WHETHER IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REACH AN AGREEMENT NOW." GLAGOLYEV QUOTES OTHER SOURCES CALLING THE SECRETARY THE "VICTOR," AND CITES ESPECIALLY THE FRENCH NEWSPAPER LES ECHOS THAT IN GIVING PREFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY THE "PRESIDENT CLEARLY INDICATED HIS DESIRE TO MOVE FURTHER DOWN THE PATH TO DETENTE."

5. GLAGOLYEV SAYS THAT "MANY OBSERVERS" DO NOT CONSIDER, HOWEVER, THAT THE NAMING OF RUMSFELD TO SCHLESINGER'S POSITION WILL CHANGE THE PENTAGON'S POSITION ON DETENTE. HE QUOTES JOHN FINNEY THAT RUMSFELD AND SCHLESINGER SHARE A SIMILAR IDEOLOGICAL VIEW OF THE WORLD, AND ALSO SAYS THAT "OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN OF THE WHITE HOUSE" DENIED THAT RUMSFELD WOULD FOLLOW A SOFTER LINE THAN HAD SCHLESINGER.

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6. DEVELOPING HIS SUPPORT FOR THE THEORY THAT THE CABINET CHANGES WERE MADE TO CONSOLIDATE THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION IN THE CONSERVATIVE WING OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AGAINST THE THREAT FROM REAGAN, GLAGOLYEV DISCUSSES AT SOME LENGTH THE VICE PRESIDENT'S DECISION NOT TO RUN FOR THAT POSITION IN 1976, CONTENDNG THAT DECISION AS WELL HAD BEEN ENGINEERED TO STRENGTHEN THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON THE RIGHT.

7. GLAGOLYEV, IN HIS CONCLUDING PARAGRAPH, SAYS THAT "THE FUTURE WILL SHOW" WHAT EFFECT THE CHANGES WILL HAVE ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. BUT HE ADDS THAT POLITICAL OBSERVERS" IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD" PAID SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THEY WILL CAUSE NO CHANGES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, AND THAT THE U.S. INTENDS TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO REACH A SALT AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

8. COMMENT: GLAGOLYEV IS LISTED IN THE USA JOURNAL MASTHEAD AS "RESPONSIBLE SECRETARY" FOR THE PUBLICATION. HIS ARTICLE IS A CAUTIOUS REPLAY, WITH ONLY MINOR DISTORTION THAT WE NOTE, OF THE U.S. PUBLIC DISCUSSION ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CABINET CHANGES. HE RECOUNTS ALL SIDES OF THE DEBATE, BUT SEEMS TO COME DOWN MOST STRONGLY ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE CANGES WERE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT TO STRENGTHEN HIS OWN HOLD ON THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. HE DOES TIE SCHLESINGER DIRECTLY TO OBSTACLES PLACED IN THE WAY OF A SALT AGREEMENT, BUT INTERESTINGLY--AND MORE DEFINITELY THAN INITIAL SOVIET COVERAGE--CONTENDS THAT THE NEW SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HOLDS THE SAME OPINIONS. WE SUSPECT THAT THIS SHIFT OF SECRETARY RUMSFELD INTO THE HARD-LINER CAMP MAY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY SOVIET NEED TO MAINTAIN THE PENTAGON AS A BELIEVABLE SCAPEGOAT ON WHICH THEY CAN CONTINUE TO HANG THE BLAME FOR U.S. ACTIONS WHICH THEY DO NOT APPROVE.  
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